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[Crim. No. 6398. In Bank. Oct. 30,1959.] 
In re JAMES DOMINICK SGRO, on Habeas Corpus. 
Ll1 Criminal Law-Plea-How Put in-Guilty-Right to Counsel. 
-The evidence supported a referee's finding that a 19-year-old 
defendant understood his right to counsel and freely waived 
it when he pleaded guilty of burglary "here he had been repre-
sented by a court-appointed attorney on a previous charge of 
felony, he was twice informed by a police officer of his right 
. to be represented by counsel on this charge, he was assisted 
in preparing an affidavit of indigency so that counsel could be 
appointed for him, the order of appointment was vacated at 
defendant's request at the preliminary examination, at which 
time the court asked him whether he wished to proceed with-
out an attorney, to which he replied, "Yes," where on direct 
examination the prosecutor asked defendant whether he was 
sware that he had a right to be represented by counsel at all 
Itages of the proceedings and that if he did not have funds 
to engage an attorney the court would appoint one for him, 
to which defendant answered affirmatively and stated that he 
wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed without repre-
sentation, and where subsequently, at his arraignment in the 
superior court, defendant again expressly waived his right to 
be represented by an attorney and declined the court's offer 
to appoint counsel for him. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 244; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§§ 257,269 et seq. 
iricK. Dig. Reference: [1] Criminal Law, § 202. 
o 
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PROCEEDING ill bllh('as I'f)\-PUS to SP('llTf' TPlpIIS" from ('u~­
tody. Writ denied. 
James Dominick Sgro, in pro. per., and Edward Molken-
buhr, Jr., under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Petitioner. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner is held under a jUdgment of con-
viction entered on his plea of guilty of burglary (Pen. Code, 
§ 459), which the court found to be in the second degree. In 
his petition in propria persona for a writ of habeas corpus 
petitioner charges that his conviction was obtained in vio-
lation of his constitutional right to counsel. 
Petitioner asserts that he was 19 years of age at the time 
he was charged with the commission of the burglary for which 
he is now imprisoned; that he appeared in court without 
counsel and entered a plea of guilty; that he was not asked 
by the court if he had counsel, or if he wished to be represented 
by counsel at this proceeding or at any other time; and that 
he did not understand or freely waive his constitutional right 
to counsel. We issued an order to show cause why the writ 
should not be granted and appointed a referee to take evidence 
and make findings. The referee found that petitioner "did I 
understand his right to counsel and freely waived it whell 
he pleaded guilty on July 3, 1958." Petitioner has filed ob-
jections to these findings. 
[1] After a review of the proceedings below, we have 
concluded that the findings of the referee are correct and that 
therefore the writ should not issue. The record discloses that 
petitioner had been represented by a court-appointed attorney 
upon a previous charge of felony; that he was twice informed 
by a police officer of his right to be represented by counsel 011 
this charge; and that he was assisted in' prepaHng an affidavit 
of indigency so that counsel could be appointed for him. The 
municipal court appointed counsel for petitioner, but the ordt·r 
of appointment was vacated at petitioner's request at the 
preliminary examination on July 1, 1958. At that time th", 
court asked petitioner whether he wished to proceed without 
an attorney, to which he replied. "Yes;" On direct examina-
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was aware that he had a right to be represented by counsel 
at all stages of the proceedings and that if he did not have 
funds to engage an attorney the court would appoint one 
for him. Petitioner answered affirmatively and stated that he 
wished to waive his right to counsel and proceed without 
representation. Subsequently, at his arraignment in the su-
perior court, petitioner again expressly waived his right to be 
represented by an attorney, and declined the court's offer 
to appoint counsel for him. The referee noted that petitioner's 
demeanor was alert, that under examination his answers were 
prompt and responsive, and that he had the mental capacity 
to understand the information repeatedly given him concern-
ing his rights. There is therefore ample evidence to support 
thc conclusion that despite his being only 19 years of age 
petitioner understood his right to counsel and the consequences 
of its waiver. 
No credible evidence was presented by petitioner to sub-
stantiate his claim that the right was not freely waived. At 
both the preliminary examination and the arraignment, peti-
tioner stated that he was acting of his own free will, without 
promises of any kind, and these statements are confirmed by 
the testimony of police officers and the <1eputy district at-
torney. Although petitioner now asserts that he had been 
promised probation if he pleaded guilty, at his arraignment 
he expressly declined to apply for probation. 
Since we have found that petitioner freely and intelligently 
waived his right to counsel (see In re Mart·illez, ante, p. 808 
[345 P.2d 449]), the order to show cause is discharged and 
the writ is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., and 
'Vhite, J., concurred. 
PETERS, J.-I dissent. 
This case is not, fundamentally, different from In re 
.llnrUncz, ante, p. 808 [345 P.2d 449], tlJis day decided. 
I dissent on the same grounds set forth in my dissent to that 
opinion. 
In this case, upon proper request, the municipal court 
appointed an attorney for the aecllsed. IJater, at the pre-
liminary hearing, the accused appeared without bis attornf'.v 
who had 11I)t been notified of his appoiutmellt. 'l'he court allll 
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appointed. The accused requcsted that thc appointment be 
vacated. The court vacated thc appointment. 
Once an attorney has been properly appointed he caullot 
be removed from the case except as provided ill sections 284 
and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The COUl"t obviously 
knew that some action had to be takcn because it entered a 
vacating order. If the attorney had been removed as provided 
in those sections, then, before a plea of' guilty could be ac-
cepted, the provisions of section 1018 of the Penal Code had 
to be complied with. They were not. 
As pointed out in my dissent in the Martinez case, the 
three code sections constitute a proper implementation by 
the Legislature of the constitutional right to counsel. Thus 
they are integral parts of the constitutional right. COllsti-
tutional rights, certainly such a basic one, as the right to 
counsel, may not be impaired with impunity. This petitioner 
was denied his constitutional rights, and for that r('aSOll the 
writ of habeas corpus, in my opinion, should issul'. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 25, 1959. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the ap-
plication should be granted. 
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